New Role for Nonparties in Tort Actions-The Empty Chair by Benson, Reed D.
1-1-1986 
New Role for Nonparties in Tort Actions-The Empty Chair 
Reed D. Benson 
University of New Mexico - School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/law_facultyscholarship 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Water Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Reed D. Benson, New Role for Nonparties in Tort Actions-The Empty Chair, 15 Colorado Law Review 1650 
(1986). 
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/law_facultyscholarship/347 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the UNM School of Law at UNM Digital Repository. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an 
authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For 
more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, 
lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu. 
The Civil
Litigator
Charles J. Kall, Denver-861-7000
Patrick F. Kenney & Richard P. Holme
Ad Hoc Editorial Committee I'r
New Role for Nonparties in Tort
Actions-The Empty Chair
by Reed D. Benson
In courtroom drama, the spotlight rarely
falls on an empty chair. That may change,
due to a new Colorado statute allowing
factfinders to consider the negligence or
fault of nonparties in tort actions.' The
new statute may not give nonparties star-
ring roles in every trial, but it will certainly
thicken the plot.
The concept of considering nonparty
fault was included within the new statute
which establishes several liability among
joint tortfeasors2 and abrogates the com-
mon law rule of joint and several liability.
CRS § 13-21-111.5 is a key element in
the 1986 tort reform legislation. In the
abolition of joint and several liability and
by allowing the factfinder to consider the
fault of nonparties who may or may not
be potentially liable to the plaintiff, the
Colorado legislature embraced a policy
that no tortfeasor should have to pay more
than his or her "fair share" of damages.
An underlying concept or goal of CRS
§ 13-21-111.5 is that all known causal
negligence or fault will be present in the
courtroom and evaluated by the factfinder.
Whether this approach will invariably re-
sult in an appropriate recovery for a de-
serving plaintiff or, in certain circum-
stances, work to preclude such a full re-
covery remains problematical. Putting
aside questions of fundamental fairness,
the "presence" of nonparties in the court-
room may raise problems for civil litiga-
tors. This article discusses the new statute
and some potential problems.
Nonparties Under the New Statute
The new statute requires the finder of
fact in a tort action to consider the negli-
gence or fault of a nonparty if (1) the
claimant has entered into a settlement
agreement with the nonparty or (2) the
defendant has given notice that a nonparty
was wholly or partially at fault.3
Notice must be given within ninety days
of the commencement of the action unless
the court determines that more time is
needed. The defendant gives notice by fil-
ing a pleading,
designating such nonparty and setting
forth such nonparty's name and last-
known address, or the best identifica-
tion of such nonparty which is possible
under the circumstances, together with
a brief statement of the basis for believ-
ing such nonparty to be at fault.4
The jury (or judge in a non-jury case) then
may assign a percentage of negligence or
fault to any nonparty who settled with the
claimant or who was properly named by
the defendant.
A finding of negligence or fault against
a nonparty does not constitute a conclusive
or presumptive finding as to that nonparty
in another action.5 The court may assess
attorneys' fees if it finds that a defendant's
designation of a nonparty was substan-
tially frivolous, groundless or vexatious.6
A New Time Factor
Once an action is commenced, the de-
fendant has ninety days (or more if the
court finds it necessary) in which to give
notice that a nonparty is wholly or partially
at fault and to identify the nonparty. 7 The
plaintiff must then amend the complaint
if he wishes to have the nonparty joined
in the suit and must do so before the statute
of limitations runs. As the limitation
period for most tort actions was recently
shortened to two years,8 the plaintiff
should act promptly to join newly discov-
ered parties if joinder is feasible and ap-
propriate.
An obvious way for a plaintiff to at-
tempt to avoid having claims time-barred
is to file the original complaint more than
three months prior to the end of the limi-
tation period. However, this may not al-
ways be feasible. In addition, reliance on
a lead time of ninety days could be to no
avail if the court allows the defendant extra
time to name a nonparty and does not also
toll the statute of limitations during that
time.9 Requests for extensions of the
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ninety-day period may become common 
as defendants endeavor to avoid penalties 
for the frivolous designation of a non­
party 10 and for violation of the good-faith 
pleading requirement. 11 
A plaintiff should also seek to preserve 
potential claims against unknown nonpar­
ties by the prompt use of interrogatories 
to the defendant. All defendants should 
be asked at an early stage to identify non­
parties upon which they intend to place 
fault. Defendants would then seem to have 
a continuing duty to inform the plaintiff 
of any such nonparties. 12 
Naming "John Doe" defendants in the 
original complaint and filling in the names 
of nonparties as they become known ordi­
narily will not work. 13 An amendment
naming a new party normally relates back 
to the original complaint only if the new 
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party, prior to the end of the limitation 
period, had such notice of the action that 
the new party will not be prejudiced in 
maintaining his defense on the merits, and 
if he knew or should have known that the 
action would have been brought against 
him if there had been no mistake as to the 
identity of the proper party. 14 
Effects of Settlement on Recovery 
The finder of fact must consider the 
negligence or fault of a person who has 
entered into a settlement agreement with 
the plaintiff. 15 This provision of the new
statute is particularly important because 
the legislature also changed the way settle­
ments are applied against judgments. The 
new law requires that the judgment be re­
duced by the percentage of fault attributed 
to any parties who have settled with the 
plaintiff. 16 In other words, the plaintiff's 
recovery is reduced not by the amount for 
which the plaintiff has settled, but by the 
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amount of negligence or fault attributed 
to the party with whom he settled. 
Impact on Motivation to Settle 
Presumably, the legislature concluded 
that the provisions of CRS § 13-21-111.5 
would not discourage the resolution and 
settlement of civil disputes. Indeed, it can 
be argued that the relative certainty that 
no one will be liable for more than his 
appropriate share will generate a strong 
incentive to evaluate a case early and settle 
before incurring substantial defense costs. 
There is another potential consequence of 
such relative certainty (knowledge that the 
potential exposure is limited to a predict­
able range, even if the amount is not pre­
cisely known). It may act to harden the 
position of the parties, and force the 
resoution of matters into the courtroom. 
Only time and experience will determine 
whether either of these situations will 
materialize. 
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Further, it remains to be seen whether
the "presence" of nonparties in the court-
room will act to discourage the settlement
of claims. The existence of a nonparty
will provide the defendant with the oppor-
tunity to try an "empty chair." The fact
that a party who is no longer in the court-
room has settled (if the fact of settlement
is deemed admissible) may cast an unwar-
ranted incriminating light on the absent
party. At the other table, the plaintiff may
have to try to "defend" the empty chair as
well as himself against the defendants'
arguments.17 In some circumstances, the
plaintiff may be in the awkward position
of having built a damaging case against a
defendant and, after settling with that de-
fendant, watching his efforts used against
him.
Finally, because the potential "pres-
ence" of a nonparty in the courtroom--
particularly a settling (non)party-may
provide certain tactical advantages to a
defendant, some defendants may have less
motivation to settle claims. Of course, it
is impossible to predict how the various
parties will view the advantages or disad-
vantages of the existence of the empty
chair. Each case will present a different
set of variables. However, it does seem
certain that in the telling of the whole story
(all causal factors present at one time in
one case), the part played by the empty
chair will take on a major role in determin-
ing how the case proceeds.
Potentially Liable Nonparties
A defendant may designate a nonparty
who remains potentially liable to the plain-
tiff, and the finder of fact must determine
the degree of negligence or fault of that
nonparty. Potentially liable nonparties in-
clude those who were not joined for
reasons of jurisdiction or venue, as well
as those the plaintiff chooses not to join.
The statute specifies that "[a]ny finding
of a degree or percentage of fault or neg-
ligence of a nonparty shall not constitute
a presumptive or conclusive findin as to
such nonparty" in another action.' As a
practical matter, this language should
work to preclude the plaintiff from assert-
ing an earlier finding of fault or negligence
of a nonparty as the basis for the offensive
use of collateral estoppel in a later suit.
This provision may act as a brake to
discourage any argument that the tradi-
tional law of collateral estoppel was some-
how changed by the statute. The legisla-
ture did not address the separate question
of whether a finding of no fault or no
negligence in a nonparty could be asserted
defensively by that nonparty when he is
made a defendant in another action.19 Ac-
tually, it did not have to. There is no
reason why the common law rules of col-
lateral estoppel should not also govern in
this circumstance.20
Effect on Joinder-Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasers Act
The abolition of joint and several liabil-
ity and the possible impact of nonparties
may encourage the plaintiff to join all po-
tentially liable persons.
On the other hand, the defendant in a
tort case now apparently will be able to
implead only where he has a claim of in-
demnity against a third party. Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 14 dictates
that the defendant may implead a third
person only where that person "is or may
be liable to him for all orpart of the plain-
tiff's claim against him." While the Uni-
form Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
remains the law, 22 the abolition of joint
and several liability negates the concept
of contribution23 and thus the use of third-
party claims to join other tortfeasors.
The abolition of joint and several liabil-
ity also removes the chief incentive and
rationale for the joinder of others by the
defendant, and provides a strong motive
for the plaintiff to join all those who may
be liable. If the plaintiff cannot or does
not join such other parties, these nonpar-
ties may provide the defendant(s) in the
courtroom with certain tactical advan-
tages. On the other hand, if the plaintiff
can and does get all potentially liable de-
fendants into the same courtroom at the
same time, the result for better or worse,
and within the limits of human fallibility,
could well represent a fair and realistic
verdict.
Joinder by the Court
Potentially liable nonparties may be
brought in at any time on the court's own
motion 24 if the court determines that they
are necessary parties to the action. 25 How-
ever, it is hard to imagine a situation where
the court would join a nonparty under the
new statute.
First, by specifying a procedure (includ-
ing the special verdict procedure) for con-
sidering the fault of nonparties, the statute
implicity endorses the policy that the liti-
gation should proceed despite the absence
of potentially liable persons. Second, the
parties undoubtedly will not want the court
to join a nonparty. If a potentially liable
person is not a party to the action, it is
because the plaintiff either would not or
could not join that person as a defendant.
The defendant apparently cannot (absent a
right of indemnity) implead a third party and,
in any event, may not want a nonparty joined.
Designation of the Unknown
Nonparty
A defendant may be able to designate
a nonparty whose identity is unknown.
The defendant must file a pleading "desig-
nating such nonparty and setting forth such
nonparty's name and last-known address,
or the best identification of such nonparty
which is possible under the circum-
stances .... 26 It is not clear how much
freedom to maneuver this language will
allow in naming "John Doe" nonparties.
The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure
make provision for the identification of
parties whose true names are unknown,27
but may not apply to nonparties. Even so,
the existing Rules are not much help in
this context.
For example, in an action arising from
a traffic accident, could a defendant make
the following good faith designation as a
nonparty, "The driver of a blue 1977
Plymouth coupe with Nebraska plates"?
or "The unknown vandal who defaced the
stop sign at the intersection of Ist and A
Streets"? The statute clearly intends that
only good faith designations are to be
made, and counsel will undoubtedly
adhere to that concept. However, the prob-
lem is not so much "good faith" as that
different perspectives can generate honest
and substantially different views of cause
or fault.
The statute does address the issue in
that the court may award attorneys' fees
if it finds that the designation of a nonparty
was substantially frivolous, groundless or
vexatious. 28 However, until the courts
begin to address these and similar ques-
tions on a case-by-case basis, the specific-
ity required in the designation of unknown
persons will remain uncertain.
Nonparties Not Potentially Liable
A defendant may give notice of any
nonparty who he believes may be wholly
or partially at fault. 29 The new statute does
not seem to require that these designated
nonparties be potentially liable to the
plaintiff before their negligence or fault
may be considered. Examples of possible
nonparties with no potential liability but
who are potentially at fault include those
shielded by a statute of limitations, cov-
ered employers who have paid worker's
compensation to the plaintiff, and public
entities protected by the Colorado Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act.3 o
The workplace injury presents a good
illustration of the "at fault but not liable"
issues raised by the new statute. An em-
ployer covered by the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act has no separate tort liability
beyond that imposed by statute to an em-
September1654
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ployee injured on the job. 3 1 However, the 
injured employee can still recover in tort 
against a third party. 32 Third-party tort­
feasors have not been allowed to implead 
employers in these work-setting cases, re­
ceive indemnity or contribution from 
them33 or, as a general proposition, assert 
the employer's negligence as a defense. 34 
CRS § 13-21-111.5 adds a new twist 
to a relatively settled area of the law. By 
designating the employer as a nonparty, 
a third-party tortfeasor would now seem 
to be able to seek reduction in his potential 
exposure by the percentage of fault attrib­
uted to the employer. In addition, the em­
ployer or insurer who pays a worker's 
compensation claim normally retains the 
right of subrogation regarding amounts 
paid to the employee if the employee re­
covers damages from a third party. 35 
These circumstances undoubtedly will 
have a substantial impact on the evalua­
tion, prosecution and defense of third­
party tort actions stemming from work­
place injuries. 
Conclusion 
The law pertaining to nonparties in 
comparative negligence actions varies 
greatly from state to state. 36 Colorado ap­
pears to be unique in that it has now 
abolished joint and several liability and 
created a role for nonparties by statute. 
The sheer novelty of the legislature's ac­
tion will increase the normal uncertainty 
that inevitably follows any major change 
in the law. 
Colorado practitioners and Colorado 
l:OUrts may find some guidance in the de-
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cisions of Kansas, 37 Oklahoma38 and New 
Mexico, 39 each of which has allowed con­
sideration of nonparty fault and abrogated 
{ or at least limited) joint and several liabil­
ity by case law. However, for now, the 
size and character of the role which non­
parties will actually play in Colorado tort 
actions will remain a mystery to be solved 
as the case law unfolds. 
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